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Abstract 
This paper studies the Spanish Premial Law applying an economic viewpoint. We reach the conclusion, that during the 
period studied (1995-2009) there has been a sharp increase in the number of civil order awarded, thus showing a 
phenomenon of “inflation”. This would imply a devaluation of the supposed merits underlying the awarding, meaning a 
corruption of the Premial system. 
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1. Introduction 
Generally speaking, incentives have received a broad attention, not only by economists, but also from 
related fields like sociology and law. This notwithstanding, interest has mainly centred on monetary 
incentives (for example Stiglitz, 2006), as this sort of compensation allows the receptor to maximise its utility 
(Becker, 1974), or on non-monetary incentives (like business cars, better offices, etc.) summarised under the 
term “fringe benefits”. Alternatively, economic analysis of law has studied mostly negative incentives, such 
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as fines and punishment. i  Nevertheless, one major category —if not the main category— of positive 
incentives used by States have so far been nearly neglected both by economists and jurists: the awarding of 
orders, medals, decorations and other honours that constitute the so called Premial Law, referring to which 
already Beccaria lamented that: 
“Upon this subject [Premial Law] the laws of all nations are silent. If the rewards proposed by academies for the 
discovery of useful truths have increased our knowledge, and multiplied good books, is it not probable that rewards, 
distributed by the beneficent hand of a sovereign, would also multiply virtuous actions.” [Beccaria [1764] (1991), p. 
83]. 
There are serious evidences that Beccaria intended to write a complete Tract on Premial Law, although he 
finally did not achieve this purpose (Jiménez, 1915:27). It was Dragonetti (1836) who published a Treatise on 
virtues and rewards. Nevertheless it is Jeremy Bentham, who might be considered the father of Premial Law 
with his work entitled Théorie des peines et des recompenses. Later, Le Grasserie (1900) published an 
important article in La Scuola positive dealing with this topic and in which he (erroneously) stated that he was 
the first to introduce the concept of Premial Law. Finally, it might be stressed that the probably most 
important monograph on this matter was published by a Spaniard, Luis Jiménez de Asúa (1915), entitled La 
recompensa como prevención general. El Derecho Premial. 
 
 
2. Orders as incentives 
Only very recently the works by Frey (2005) and Frey and Neckermann (2006) have drawn their attention 
on the topic from an economic viewpoint, setting a significant theoretical framework although lacking any 
empirical analysis. ii  Frey (2005:4) points out some possible reasons why economists have so largely 
disregarded the study of awards: 
x Firstly, awards may be considered to be less efficient as an incentive device, because they are not 
fungible and difficult to apply marginally. 
x Secondly, awards may just be a reflection of success and high monetary income. 
x Thirdly, economists assume that awards as such are of no interest to recipients as, after all, they 
cannot be consumed. 
Yet, this last point deserves some deeper consideration, as, in fact, medals and orders were often used as a 
monetary substitute. For example, during the second German Reich (1871-1918) there existed a Sonderklasse 
(an especial class) of the main orders made completely of brilliants. After the awarding, these orders were 
usually given back to the Official Jeweller Godet, Wagner & Sohn y Gb. Friedländer in Berlin, who 
exchanged them with another piece made of simile-stones, paying the recipient the difference in cash. This 
procedure was indeed intended by the Kaiser as a form of “paying their subjects without offending their 
honour”. 
This notwithstanding, there are major differences between awards and monetary compensations, that fully 
justify analysing them separately (Frey, 2005:5): 
x The material costs of awards may be very low, or even nil, for the donor, but the value to the recipient 
may be very high. In this respect, the cost benefit balance is therefore unlike that of gifts (which are generally 
valued less by the recipient that what they cost to the donor). 
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x Accepting an award entails a special relationship, in which the recipient owes (some measure of) loyalty to 
the donor. The respective contract is, however, tacit, incomplete, and difficult (if not impossible) to enforce 
by the donor. 
x Awards are a better incentive instrument than a monetary payment when the recipient’s performance can 
only be vaguely determined. 
x Awards are less likely to crowd out the intrinsic motivation of the recipients than monetary compensation. 
x Awards are not taxed, while monetary income is. 
In fact many authors like Rousseau and Bentham had a very negative attitude towards monetary 
compensations, while they strongly favoured orders and decorations. Thus, for example, the Genevan 
philosopher strongly rejected all sort of pecuniary reward, stressing his point of with view the following 
arguments: 
“[Monetary rewards] have the defect of not being public, of not appealing continuously to 
the eyes and the heart, of disappearing as soon as they bestowed and of not leaving any visible 
trace that stimulate emulation, perpetuating the honour that is supposed to accompany them.” 
A similar attitude was shared by Jeremy Bentham, although with a less idealistic and more pragmatic point 
of view, as he concludes that “although [pecuniary rewards] act neither as an example nor forming the 
character, […] they are frequently an indispensable necessity” (Bentham, 1818:II:103). 
* * * 
The discussion about the convenience of pointing out from society those persons who have achieved 
outstanding merits —either civil or military— distinguishing them with a distinctive sign (medals, orders, 
honours and other awards) can be drawn back to the times of the ancient Greeks, more precisely, to the final 
times of the Hellenistic period. Following the excellent study by Fuhrmann (1992) we can find the origin of 
this debate in Aristotle’s Politics. In it, the author from Stagira discusses the convenience of distinguishing 
publicly (τιμή) those citizens who had acted in favour of the polis, concluding that, although it might have a 
positive effect, it should be discharged because of the danger abuse: 
“Although this idea might seem attractive, it is not riskless. It might, in fact, incite wrong 
awarding and cause political disturbs”. [Aristotle (1951:50)] 
But, these are the thoughts of a philosopher, not of a statesman, and we have broad evidence that civil 
orders were very common in times of Aristotle, and even about the hot tempered discussions about their 
awarding. As an example, we might adduce the discussion in 336 BC about the convenience of publicly 
distinguishing Demosthenes (384-332 BC) for his merits in favour of the Athens. Ctesiphon proposed that his 
friend Demosthenes should be rewarded with a golden crowniii for his distinguished services to the state. The 
opposition to Demosthenes, headed by Aeschines (389-314 BC), tried to discredit the formers achievements 
defending Athenian independence from Philip’s Macedonia, Aeschines accusing Ctesiphon of having violated 
the law in bringing forward the motion. The matter remained in abeyance till 330 BC (six years after the 
original event had taken place), when the two rivals delivered their speeches Against Ctesiphon and On the 
Crown, which resulted in a complete victory for Demosthenes. As Athens was then living a period of relative 
calm and political stability, the public debate between Demosthenes and Aeschines became a mayor event that 
attracted crowds from abroad Athens, being termed by Theophrastus the “Battle of Speakers”. 
Formally, it was Ctesiphon who was being accused; nevertheless it was clear to everybody that the attack 
was really directed against Demosthenes. In his speech, Aeschines adduced, —besides the strictly legal 
arguments— on the risk of an “inflation” of orders due to a relaxation in the merits needed for the awarding. 
Due to the importance of his argument we believe it is worth quoting in length: 
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“And now that I have mentioned crowns and public honors, while it yet rests on my mind, 
let me recommend this precaution. It must be your part, Athenians, to put an end to this 
frequency of public honors, these precipitate grants of crowns; else they who obtain them will 
owe you no acknowledgment, nor shall the state receive the least advantage; for you never can 
make bad men better, and those of real merit must be cast into the utmost dejection. Of this 
truth I shall convince you by the most powerful arguments. Suppose a man should ask at what 
time this state supported the most illustrious reputation in the present days, or in those of our 
ancestors? With one voice you would reply, “In the days of our ancestors”. At what time did 
our citizens display the greatest merit then or now? They were then eminent; now, much less 
distinguished. At what time were rewards, crowns, proclamations, and public honors of every 
kind most frequent —then or now? Then they were rare and truly valuable; then the name of 
merit bore the highest lustre; but now it is tarnished and effaced; while your honors are 
conferred by course and custom, not with judgment and distinction. It may possibly seem 
unaccountable that rewards are now more frequent, yet that public affairs were then more 
flourishing; that our citizens are now less worthy, but were then of real eminence. This is a 
difficulty which I shall endeavor to obviate. Do you imagine, Athenians, that any man whatever 
would engage in the games held on our festivals, or in any others where the victors receive a 
crown, in the exercises of wrestling, or in any of the several athletic contests, if the crown was 
to be conferred, not on the most worthy, but on the man of greatest interest? Surely no man 
would engage. But now, as the reward of such their victory is rare, hardly to be obtained, truly 
honorable, and never to be forgotten, there are champions found ready to submit to the severest 
preparatory discipline, and to encounter all the dangers of the contest.” [Aeschines [330 BC] 
(1961), p. 1308] 
As we will demonstrate in this paper, Aeschines arguments are still valid today, and the current Spanish 
civil orders system suffers of exactly the same problems and bears the same risks he stated referring to Athens 
—only that nowadays nobody seems to care, and it does not seem probable that a speech of this sort would 
attract any public interest. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
In recent times Spanish media have mainly —not to say exclusively— covered news regarding orders and 
awards in those cases which seem of dubious merit or even worst, due to favoritism. This easily generates in 
the public view a general suspiciousness towards the Premial system as a whole (cf. Castellano, 2010).  
Does the existence of such cases of dubious awardings that reflect the merits required for the bestowing of 
orders are being loosened? In this part of our work we try to empirically contrast this hypothesis. Due to the 
restriction of numerical information (unlike other European countries, such as Germany or Great Britain, 
Spain lacks a Chancellery of orders), we will have to limit our study to the highest grades (or classes) of each 
order —collars and grand crosses— as their awarding have to be published in the Official State Gazette 
(BOE, Boletín Oficial del Estado). The time frame is set between 1995 and 2009, thus permitting us to 
differentiate between legislature periods governed both by the popular and the socialist party. Only three 
orders —the Orden de Alfonso X El Sabio, the Orden de San Raimundo de Peñafort and the Orden de 
Solidaridad Social— diminish or remain constant.  
Consequently, we may conclude, that eight out of eleven orders present (in some cases sharp) increases in 
the number of awardings. This would again validate our hypothesis of an inflation of civil orders. As we have 
already stated before, this raising tendency contravenes the general trend of other European countries, like 
Germany´s Bundesverdienstkreuz (vid supra) or the French Légion d`Honneur.  
Two other questions might be worth pointing out. First, it seems paradox that the most seldom awarded 
Grand Cross —and, thus, the one that could be considered in highest esteem— is the one corresponding to the 
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Order of the Agricultural Merit (even though it is bestowed in three different categories: Agricultural Merit, 
Fishing Merits and Forestal Merits). Second, as can be seen in figure 1, during the period studied only 17 
percent of the orders were awarded to women (with slightly higher values in Medal of Work, the order of 
Carlos III and that of Merits in Sports). As a comparison: between 1965 and 2004 the percentage of orders 
awarded to women in Great Britain shifted from 16 to 35 (Phillips, 2004:73). Also, the german 
Bundesverdienstkreuz, went up from 16 to 25 in 2007 percent, when the former President of the Federal 
Republic, Horst Köhler, adopted a politic that favored awardings to women, after what this valued raised to 
30.5 percent in 2009. For its part, the Légion d`Honneur has moved from a feminine quota of 8 percent in 
1985 to 18 percent in 2006, showing from then on a clear tendency towards a more equal distribution between 
genders, as shown by the fact, that already in 2005 the numbers of women proposed for the Légion reached 50 
percent. Thus, it seems more astonishing that Spain lacks so far behind in this question, even after nearly eight 
years of a socialist government, which considers gender equality one of its main goals and created a specific 
Ministry for this matter. 
Figure 1: Civil Spanish Orders (Grand Crosses and Medals). Awards by gender. 
 
 
The Chi-Square Tests applied to the variables period of office and gender suggests that both variables are 
significantly positively associated. Of a total of 3606 awards, 592 were awarded during the first period of 
office of the Partido Popular (16.4 % of the total), 1592 (44.1%) during the second, and 1422 (39.4%) during 
the first period of office of Zapatero. 
 
Table 1. Chi-Square Test 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 110.501 4 ,000 
Likelihood Ratio 114,471 4 ,000 
Linear-by-Linear Ass. 46,162 1 ,000 
N of Valid Cases 3606   
 
 
If we consider the differences between each of the three periods, the percentage of men awarded was 
higher than the theoretically expected during the first and the second period of office of the Partido Popular, 
and lower during Zapatero's government. On the other way, in the case of women and institutions, the 
percentage of awarded was only higher than the theoretically expected during the period of office of the 
PSOE. In other words, we can conclude that Partido Popular has a tendency to decorate more men of the 
theoretically expected, whereas the Partido Socialista tends to decorate more women and institutions. 
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Table 2. ANOVA 
Frequency Sum of Sq. df Mean Sq. F Sig 
Between Groups 387958,181 2 193979,090 143,457 ,000 
Within Groups 4871806,653 3603 1352,175   
Total 5259844,834 3605    
 
Table 3. Tests of Robustness 
 Statistic df 1 df 2 Sig 
Levene 173,937 2 3603 ,000 
Weich 357,287 2 2254 ,000 
Brown-Forsythe 187,135 2 3557 ,000 
 
 
Table 4. Multiple comparisons 
Office I  Office II. Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. 
error 
Sig. 95% confi. Interv 
Lower b. Upper b. 
PP1 PP2 
PSOE1 
-17,676* 
-29,287* 
1,321 
1,680 
,000 
,000 
-20,79 
-33,24 
-14,56 
-25,33 
PP2 PP1 
PSOE1 
17,676* 
-11,612* 
1,321 
2,069 
,000 
,000 
14,56 
-16,47 
20,79 
.6,75 
PSOE1 PP1 
PP2 
29,297* 
11,612* 
1,680 
2,069 
,000 
,000 
25,33 
6,75 
33,24 
16,47 
*The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
The analysis of variance, suggests that the means in the number of decorated between each of the three 
periods of office are significantly different (p-value <.05). In our case we cannot assume equality of variances 
(see the result of Levene statistic), so is necessary to use the Robust Tests of Equality of Means to corroborate 
our results. As we can deduce of this test, the p-value in both cases is < .05, so we can now reject the null 
hypothesis of equality of means. 
On the other hand, as we can see in the Multiple Comparisons post hoc analysis (table 2), the mean 
difference is significant at the .05 level in all the cases, so we can conclude that the number of awardings is 
not only increasing, but statistically different between periods, although they are less accentuated between the 
last two periods of office. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
The main aim of this study has been to analyze the Spanish Laudative System from an economic 
viewpoint. For this purpose, we start with a brief overview of the evolution and current situation of the 
Spanish Premial System. We then analyze the concepts of “merit” and “meritorious” as they constitute the 
base upon which to decide which actions should be worth a social distinction. After a brief presentation of the 
current system of civil orders in Spain, we enter the nucleus of our study: the question whether an 
uncontrolled awarding of orders and medals could derive in inflation, thus conducing to a devaluation of the 
underlying merits and, as a consequence, a distortion (or, worst, a corruption) of the whole Premial Law. Our 
study is completed with an empirical analysis of the highest classes of the Spanish civil awards, which 
confirms the previous hypothesis. 
This question, which has so far been ignored by Spanish politicians, has nevertheless attracted the attention 
of several other European governments (see for examples Philips, 2004), which have substantially reformed 
40   Thomas Baumert /  Procedia Economics and Finance  1 ( 2012 )  34 – 40 
their Premial Law in recent times. As we have already pointed out, Spain presents an opposite trend regarding 
the awarding of others in comparison to France, Germany or Great Britain. In addition to this, Spain also 
presents a heavy bias towards man in the number of awards, while France and Germany have a much more 
equilibrated distribution by gender. Finally, Spanish Laudative Law suffers from a proliferation regional of 
orders that complement the already complex system on national awards, without any instance coordinating 
them. In this sense, Germany´s decision to limit the number of awards per year (e.g. restricting to 30 the 
maximum of awards to be bestowed to Members of the Parliament), and favoring awards to women, might 
show the path to be followed. 
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i Supposedly, “positive” incentives like tax reductions should actually be considered a lessening of a negative incentive.  
ii According to Frey (2005), p. 33 awards constitute a type of non-material extrinsic reward whose efficiency as incentive instrument is 
determined by: (1) The more effective self-imposed restrictions to control the number of awards are. (2) The more the donor is able to 
differentiate between awards. (3) The lower the probability is that the award is publicly refused. (4) The less possible it is to formulate 
specific ex-ante contracts, and to monitor them ex-post. (5) The more important intrinsic motivation is. (6) The fewer the other principals 
are able to independently supply similar awards. 
iii The golden crown was one of the most important civil awards conferred in Athens. 
